The paper offers a new theoretical framework to examine the role of intermediaries between creators and potential users of new inventions. Using a model of universityindustry technology transfer, we demonstrate that technology transfer offices can provide an opportunity to economize on a critical component of efficient innovation investments: the expertise to locate new, external inventions and to overcome the problem of sorting 'profitable' from 'unprofitable' ones. The findings may help explain the surge in university patenting and licensing since the Bayh-Dole Act of 1980. Furthermore, the study identifies several limitations to the potential efficiency of intermediation in innovation.
Introduction
One major constraint to the success of many invention-based ventures proves to be the high degree of uncertainty about their pro…tability (Arrow, 1962; Kamien and Schwartz, 1982) . Apart from technical di¢culties, it is often hard to assess the commercial value of inventions that may lead to entirely new products without knowing the demand for it. As a consequence, potential investors act on expected values, and pro…table new technology may not be adopted due to pessimistic beliefs. In this paper, we examine the role that intermediaries between creators, …nanciers, and users of new technology can play in mitigating the problem of uncertainty.
Obviously, such intermediaries exist. Technology transfer o¢ces (TTOs) intermediate between university researchers and industrial …rms. They assess the commercial potential of research results, such as the potential applications of an invention, its competitive advantages, novelty and likely markets, and seek …rms that have the capability, interest and resources to take on the development of the invention. Normally, they contact several prospective licensees and pursue one of them. Finally, they negotiate a licensing contract. 1 Similarly, venture capitalists play a role as intermediaries between innovative entrepreneurs and private investors, concentrating in industries where information gaps between entrepreneurs and investors are commonplace. Their activity includes the evaluation of innovative ventures and the investment in selected start-up projects. 2 Other examples include underwriters who use their expertise and network of contacts to locate investors with high valuations for the securities of a new start-up …rm, and technologybased business incubators who intermediate between new start-up …rms, …nanciers, and industrial customers.
Despite their obvious presence, such innovation intermediaries have received little attention in the theoretical literature. 3 In this paper, we o¤er a theoretical framework to explore the conditions under which innovation intermediaries emerge and analyze the role they can play in reducing the uncertainty problem in the process of new technology adoption. We exemplify the issues in the context of university-industry technology transfer, and present what is perhaps the simplest model that still captures the essence of the problem. The model assumes that a potential market for invention fails to exist due to uncertainty 1 See, e.g., Association of University Technology Managers Web Page, http://www.autm.net, and the O¢ce of Technology Licensing Web Page, http://otl.stanford.edu/about/resources/history.html. 2 For a comprehensive survey over the venture capital literature, see Gompers and Lerner (1999) . 3 There is growing, mainly empirical, literature on …nancial intermediation in the process of innovation and new technology adoption (see, e.g. Gompers and Lerner, 1999) . For a comprehensive survey over the intermediation theory literature, see Spulber (1999) .
about the pro…tability of adoption. On the other hand, the bene…ts from adopting profitable inventions are, if realized, in aggregate large enough to compensate an agent, called the intermediary, for acquiring the ability to locate new inventions, identify those that are pro…table, and recommend them to potential investors. However, because of asymmetric information the intermediary might claim a high quality even when the invention is of low quality. Moreover, the intermediary may have an incentive to do so whenever it does not bear the cost of adopting the invention. As a consequence, investors' payments to the intermediary may not be large enough to recoup the cost of acquiring the expertise in the …rst place, making active intermediation in innovation impossible. The model admits two types of equilibria under certain conditions: innovation equilibria in which an intermediary invests in expertise, evaluates inventions, and matches the pro…table ones with potential investors, and equilibria in which no innovation occurs. The central insight of the analysis can be described as follows: Innovation intermediaries provide an opportunity for potential users and …nanciers of new inventions to economize on a critical component of innovation decisions under uncertainty: the expertise to locate new, external inventions and to overcome the problem of sorting 'pro…table' from 'unpro…table' ones. As noted by Cohen and Levinthal (1989) , acquiring this expertise involves considerable sunk costs. Thus, potential investors may bene…t from sharing expertise. We …nd that an intermediary may be able to exploit economies of sharing expertise.
The analysis reveals that the extent to which economies of sharing are realized depends critically on two factors. First, the possibility to use success-based payments, and second, the number of available inventions. If the payo¤ for the intermediary can be tied to the investors' payo¤, e.g., by running royalties, we show that the intermediary will select as many pro…table inventions as possible (i.e., employ a "non-wasteful" selection strategy). Because this strategy increases the probability that an investor will obtain a high return to investment, the usage of success-based payments tends to increase investors' valuation of the intermediation service. Nevertheless, simply tying the intermediary's payo¤ to that of the investor is not su¢cient to ensure that the intermediary's revenue will be large enough to recoup the cost of expertise. In addition, a critical mass must be reached on the input side. We show that an increase in the size of the invention pool can increase investors' willingness to pay for intermediation activity. However, as it turns out, this relationship need not necessarily be monotonic. The reason is a multiplicity of consistent equilibrium selection strategies, thus leading to multiple equilibria in the innovation subgames. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that intermediation in innovation can become viable, considering all costs, if the number of inventions is above some threshold level. The …ndings in our model are consistent with empirical evidence.
Furthermore, we analyze welfare properties of the innovation equilibria. While intermediation helps reducing the uncertainty problem, social e¢ciency may be limited by the intermediary's incentive to o¤er inventions of low pro…tability whenever there are no pro…table inventions available, and by the high potential for coordination failure due to the multiplicity of equilibria. Social ine¢ciencies may also arise from competition among multiple intermediaries. We …nd that combining intermediation services, e.g. in regional networks, may be a way to improve social welfare.
The work most closely related in the intermediation literature appears to be that of Biglaiser (1993) and Lizzeri (1999) . Both authors examine models where sellers and buyers are asymmetrically informed about the quality of a product. Biglaiser shows that the concern for reputation may induce an in…nitely lived middleman who buys and resells goods to inspect the quality and signal it through his choice of price. 4 Lizzeri investigates the extent to which quality can be signalled by means of a certi…cation agency, taking into account that the agency may bene…t from information manipulation. In both papers, the intermediary serves as a device for signalling high quality, but plays no active role otherwise. In contrast, we focus on a situation where initially no party has private information, so signalling of information is no issue in our paper. Instead, we analyze the incentives of an intermediary to invest in expertise and make proper use of it. Caillaud and Jullien (2001) analyze a model with intermediaries who are able to match suitable trading partners. Competition in registration and transaction fees is shown to give rise to dominant …rm equilibria that are similar to the equilibria with concentrated intermediation in our model. However, in contrast to our paper, an intermediary is endowed with expertise by assumption which makes truthful matching always credible in their model.
Related is also the work on venture capitalists by Chan (1983) . He too considers a model where potential investors must decide whether or not to invest in an innovative venture. His focus, however, is di¤erent from ours. We focus on the problem of uncertainty about the characteristics of a new invention and the corresponding question of whether an intermediary can reduce this uncertainty, whereas Chan does not address the uncertainty problem but instead focuses on the moral hazard problem with inventor e¤ort and the corresponding question of whether an intermediary can induce inventors to expend more e¤ort. 5 In the innovation literature, the paper closest to ours seems to be that of . They too consider a theoretical model of university-industry technology transfer. 6 Their model assumes that there is a single new invention and a single potential adopter and that a TTO is responsible for executing the technology transfer. Their central …nding is that royalty licensing can alleviate a moral hazard problem with inventor e¤ort. By contrast, we consider a situation with multiple inventions and multiple investors and explore the reasons why intermediaries such as TTOs emerge. Our paper hence complements their work.
In the next section we develop the formal intermediation model. Section 3 presents the equilibrium analysis. In Section 4 we consider competition between intermediaries. Section 5 endogenizes the inventor involvement in the process of new technology adoption. Section 6 concludes with a discussion of empirical evidence, policy implications, and directions for future research.
Model
In the following we will exemplify the issue of intermediation in innovation in the context of a university-industry technology transfer model. Intermediation by venture capitalists, underwriters, and technology-based incubators could be modeled along similar lines. An analysis of these innovation intermediaries is discussed in Section 6.
Consider a situation with a …nite set of inventors N´f1; ::::; ng ; each of which has one invention, and a …nite set of …rms, K´f1; ::::; kg : Without loss of generality we can assume that k · n (i.e. there are at least as many inventions as there are …rms). Inventors need an investor for the commercialization of their invention, while …rms seek to commercialize one promising new invention. 7 The cost of commercializing an invention is A > 0. Each …rm j 2 K is characterized by an e¢ciency parameter¯j > 0; with 1¸¢ ¢ ¢¸¯k: All parties are risk-neutral.
One of the key features of new inventions is that their return to adoption is uncertain. To capture this feature, let q denote the quality of an invention and assume that the adoption return is q = V H with probability p; and q = V L with probability (1 ¡ p), where 6 For empirical studies of technology transfer from universities and federal laboratories to industry, see . 7 That is, we assume that each potential investor has …nancial funds for one innovation. An alternative interpretation is that, even if a …rm can invest in more than one invention, k represents the total number of innovation opportunities.
4 0 < p < 1 and 0 < V L < V H : 8 Firms are unable to observe the quality level of an invention before they make the investment. If …rm j adopts an invention of quality q i ; it obtains a return¯jq i . 9 We make the following two assumptions:
Assumption A1 implies that even the most e¢cient …rm would not adopt an invention of unknown quality. Assumption A2 implies that even the least e¢cient …rm would adopt a high-quality invention when there is no uncertainty. Under these assumptions a potential market for invention fails to exist due to uncertainty about the pro…tability of adoption. Now we introduce an intermediary, called the technology transfer o¢ce (TTO). We assume that the TTO is also risk neutral. The TTO can choose to make a sunk investment of C > 0 to acquire an expertise that enables it to locate a new invention and recognize whether it is of high or low quality. C can for instance be interpreted as the cost of human capital development or the cost of hiring personnel with professional competence in specialized …elds. For simplicity, we neglect any variable costs of evaluating inventions, which seems fairly in accordance with empirical observations. As noted for instance by Levinthal (1989, 1990) , the cost of acquiring the ability to assess the value of new, external knowledge is typically substantial compared to immediate costs of information processing, which are often negligible. 10 We are interested in a situation where the inventions are owned by a university and the university's TTO is responsible for executing the technology transfer to …rms. In Section 4 we extend the basic model by allowing for multiple TTOs. The participation of faculty-inventors in university-industry technology transfer is considered in Section 5. verify that the results of the paper continue to hold in the case of more than two types. 9 Notice that we capture the e¢ciency of a …rm through the value that the …rm can create by adopting any invention. E¢ciency on the other hand can also be captured through lower cost of developing and implementing an invention. In other words, we could have multiplied the adoption cost A with a …rm-speci…c e¢ciency parameter. Our results continue to hold in such a case. 1 0 We can verify that the results obtained in this paper continue to hold when there is a small cost of expertise per invention. Furthermore, the results also hold if the investment in expertise would enable the intermediary to obtain only a noisy (but informative) signal about the commercial value of new inventions, or if …rms have some a priori information about the pro…tability of adopting an invention. The critical point is that, even if …rms possess some information, the intermediary can choose to get better informed by making the investment C > 0:
5
The timing and nature of decisions by the TTO and …rms are as follows. At date 0, the TTO decides whether to invest in expertise or not. The investment is observable. If it does not invest, the game ends and payo¤s to all players are zero. If it invests, it observes the number of high-quality inventions that are available, denoted by m; where m · n: At date 1, the TTO and …rms play the following innovation game. The strategy for the TTO is a selection rule, denoted by ¾: The TTO o¤ers each …rm j 2 K an invention according to its selection rule ¾; and charges a fraction ½ j of the expected revenue accruing to the …rm once it adopts the new technology, where ½ j 2 (0; 1] : 11 Formally, let ¾ = fs j g j2K be a set of functions, where s j : f1; ::::; ng ! f0; 1g for each j 2 K: Here s j (m) = 1 means that …rm j 2 K receives a high-quality invention, and s j (m) = 0 means that …rm j 2 K receives a low-quality invention, when there are m high-quality inventions. We assume that
At date 2, each …rm accepts or rejects the TTO's o¤er. Each …rm has a belief about the TTO's selection choice. We denote the set of …rms that participate in technology transfer by P; and the cardinality of P by #P: A participating …rm invests A to implement the invention, and payo¤s are realized.
Let ¼ j denote the probability that …rm j 2 P will receive a high-quality invention, given s j . That is,
Let1 j be …rm j's belief that it will obtain a high-quality invention, andP µ K denote the subset of …rms that the TTO believes will participate in technology transfer. The expected payo¤ of a …rm j 2 K; from participation is then
and the expected payo¤ of the TTO is
if it invests in expertise. We assume that …rm j is willing to participate in technology transfer whenever its expected payo¤ from adoption, as given by (1), is nonnegative. Similarly, the TTO is willing to invest in expertise whenever its expected payo¤ from such an investment, as given by (2), is nonnegative. So, a necessary condition for intermediation activity is
which states that the cost of expertise is smaller than the maximal social gains from technology transfer. We assume that A3 holds.
Intermediation equilibria
In the absence of an intermediary, …rms have no incentive to adopt an invention in the situation characterized by assumptions A1 and A2 due to uncertainty about the pro…tability of adoption. The key question is whether this uncertainty can be credibly resolved through intermediation activity. We are interested in the subgame-perfect equilibrium of the overall game where equilibrium strategies constitute a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in every subgame. In the following we will show that intermediation equilibria with innovation may indeed exist under assumptions A1 through A3. Working backwards, we start with the examination of the innovation game at date 1.
Non-wasteful equilibrium
We …rst characterize the intermediary's equilibrium selection strategy in the continuation game after its investment in expertise. For this we make use of the following de…nition:
De…nition 1 Suppose P is the set of …rms that participate in technology transfer in an equilibrium of the innovation game. A non-wasteful equilibrium is an equilibrium in which
In a non-wasteful equilibrium each high-quality invention is assigned to some participating …rm, as long as there are fewer high-quality inventions than …rms. In the case where there are more high-quality inventions than participating …rms, all …rms receive a high-quality invention.
Proposition 1 Suppose the TTO invests in expertise, then all Bayesian Nash equilibria of the innovation game in which at least one …rm participates are non-wasteful.
Proof. Suppose in a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game the set of …rms that participate is given by P; with P 6 = ;.
Case (i): 0 < m · #P: Suppose towards a contradiction that P j2P s j (m) < m: Since P 6 = ;; this implies that there exists some j 0 2 P such that s j 0 (m) = 0. Consider the following deviation by the TTO:ŝ j 0 (m) = 1: Clearly such a deviation is feasible. The probability that …rm j 0 will receive a high-quality invention, given the deviation, iŝ
Now, for any selection of contracts
Clearly, the TTO's payo¤ increases, which is a contradiction. Hence,
Case (ii): m > #P: A similar line of arguments establishes that
Proposition 1 reveals that an intermediary who has invested in expertise always bene…ts from choosing a non-wasteful selection strategy, given it believes that at least one investor will participate in the innovation game. This result highlights the crucial role of successbased compensation for intermediation in innovation: because the intermediary gains when a commercialized invention yields a high return, it has an incentive to select as many high-quality inventions as possible. By contrast, it would have no such incentive under a …xed-fee payment scheme. This implies that even though the intermediary has no means to credibly reveal the true nature of an invention, potential investors can infer from the usage of success-based payments that selecting inventions of high commercial value is a priority for the intermediary. The …nding can account for the frequent usage of successbased licensing methods such as royalty (fee per unit of output) and equity contracts in university-industry technology transfer ). 12 The next lemma states an important property of a non-wasteful equilibrium when the number of inventions tends to in…nity.
Lemma 1 Suppose P µ K is the set of …rms that participate in a non-wasteful equilibrium of the innovation game, then lim n!1 ¼ j = 1 for all j 2 P , P µ K:
In a non-wasteful equilibrium,
Thus, when the number of inventions gets large enough, the probability that a licensee…rm obtains a high return approaches 1 in any equilibrium of the innovation game in which at least one …rm participates. In contrast, note that under a …xed-fee payment scheme the probability that a licensee-…rm obtains a high return would not approach 1 in every equilibrium in which at least one …rm participates when the number of inventions goes to in…nity. Note further that in the absence of an intermediary the probability of obtaining a high return always remains p, irrespective of any variation in the size of the invention pool.
The lemma is now used to prove our …rst main result.
Proposition 2 If n is large enough, there are two types of subgame-perfect equilibria. One involves investment in expertise by the TTO and participation of all …rms. The other involves no investment in expertise by the TTO and no participation of any …rm.
Proof. Consider …rst the continuation game where the TTO has invested in expertise. Suppose there is one …rm that participates. So we know by Proposition 1 that in this case the TTO will choose a strategy ¾ so that the equilibrium will be non-wasteful. We now show that in this case in fact all …rms participate when n is large enough. Let
be the set of contracts such that
for all j 2 K: We show that
exists if n is large enough. Let¯kV H ¡ A = ¢: By assumption A2, ¢ > 0 is such that the least e¢cient …rm will participate if it obtains a high-quality technology for sure. Choosen large enough such that
In a non-wasteful equilibrium, we have that
since¯j¸¯k for any j 2 P; P µ K: Thus, ½ 0 j can be chosen small enough such that
Hence, if n is large enough, there is a contract ½ 0 j such that condition (4) is satis…ed for …rm j, and since j is arbitrary,
It is easy to check that for n large enough
is indeed part of every subgame-perfect equilibria in which the TTO invests in expertise. This follows from Proposition 1 and since the TTO's expected payo¤ is increasing in ½ j and #P:
To complete this part of the proof we show that the TTO …nds it optimal to invest in expertise if n is large enough, provided that P 6 = ;; i.e. it expects at least one …rm to participate in the continuation game. From Lemma 1, n can be chosen large enough such that for any " 2 [0; 1] ;¯j
Hence,
We can write the TTO's revenue as
where the …rst equality follows from1 j = ¼ j in a non-wasteful equilibrium, the second equality follows from the assumption that the …rms will participate whenever their expected payo¤ is non-negative and the third (weak) inequality from (6) . Furthermore, for any C that satis…es assumption A3 we can choose " small enough such that
is satis…ed. Consequently, the TTO chooses to invest in expertise. Now reconsider the subgame that follows the investment in expertise by the TTO. We will construct a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the continuation game in which no …rm participates. One such equilibrium would be the one where the TTO chooses to o¤er only available low-quality inventions, together with any set of licensing contracts. Since n is large enough by hypothesis, in this case all …rms would receive a low-quality invention with high probability. If …rms have compatible beliefs, i.e. they assign probability 0 to the TTO playing a strategy ¾ such that the equilibrium will be non-wasteful, they prefer not to participate. Thus, given this equilibrium of the subgame, the TTO chooses not to invest in expertise in the …rst place.
This completes the proof, since we have shown that, if n is large enough, in any subgame-perfect equilibrium either all …rms participate and the TTO invests in expertise, or no …rm participates and the TTO does not invest in expertise.
Proposition 2 reveals that the feasibility of success-based payments, while necessary, is not su¢cient to guarantee e¤ective intermediation activity. Required is also a critical mass on the input side. As we demonstrate, a larger pool of commercializable technologies can make the probability that unpro…table inventions are selected small in any non-wasteful equilibrium. An increase in the pool size thus tends to enhance potential investors' willingness to participate in the innovation game. However, as the proof of Proposition 2 also reveals, this relationship need not be necessarily monotonic. The reason is the multiplicity of consistent equilibrium selection strategy beliefs, leading to multiple non-wasteful equilibria in the innovation game. Nevertheless, we demonstrate that the expected revenue for the TTO will be large enough to recoup the cost of expertise if the number of inventions exceeds a threshold level, and intermediation in innovation becomes viable.
The intuition behind the result is that intermediaries can provide an opportunity for investors to collectively share the expertise that is needed to overcome the problem of locating new technologies and sorting pro…table from unpro…table ones. 13 If the number of inventions is large enough, it pays for an intermediary to invest in expertise and reduce the uncertainty problems surrounding the adoption of new technology in the economy. Technology transfer then occurs in a situation where no transfer would occur without an intermediary.
Note however that social e¢ciency in the market for inventions may still be limited by the intermediary's incentive to recommend inventions of low pro…tability whenever it does not bear the cost of adopting the inventions. Note further that the innovation game admits equilibria in which more e¢cient …rms invest in unpro…table inventions while less e¢cient …rms invest in pro…table ones. In addition, ine¢ciencies may result if coordination between …rms and the intermediary as envisioned in the innovation equilibria does not occur. As the proposition shows, there always exists an equilibrium in which neither the intermediary nor potential investors are active. This equilibrium arises when potential investors assign probability 0 to the intermediary employing a non-wasteful strategy, and the intermediary expects the set of participating investors to be empty. Fortunately, the equilibrium without innovation appears to be rather fragile. It can be shown that for n large enough every sequential equilibrium involves investment in expertise by the TTO and participation by all …rms.
E¢cient equilibrium
In the following we will identify a particular equilibrium in which the gains from innovation are maximized.
De…nition 2
The e¢cient strategy is a strategy ¾ such that s j (t) = 1 for all j · t: The e¢cient equilibrium is the equilibrium in which the TTO uses the e¢cient strategy.
In the e¢cient equilibrium each high-quality invention is assigned to the most e¢cient …rms as long as there are fewer high-quality inventions than …rms. In the case where there are more high quality inventions than …rms, all …rms receive a high-quality invention.
Non-wasteful equilibrium allows us to characterize the participation decision of …rms only when the TTO has access to a large invention pool. Apart from being intuitively plausible, e¢cient equilibrium also allows us to characterize the participation decision of …rms when the invention pool is not very large. To be speci…c, de…ne
Now letn be the smallest integer such that
Thusn is the minimum number of inventions that would make it pro…table for the most e¢cient …rm to participate when it for sure gets a high-quality invention if there is one. If the invention pool is smaller than this, it can not be pro…table for any …rm to participate. The next proposition establishes the existence of a unique (up to relabelling of nonparticipating …rms) e¢cient equilibrium, and provides a characterization of …rm participation in technology transfer.
Proposition 3 Suppose n¸n:
There exists a unique e¢cient equilibrium withk · k such that all …rms j ·k license an invention if the TTO invests in expertise. Moreover, the TTO invests in expertise if
is the probability that each licensee-…rm receives a high-quality invention in the e¢cient equilibrium.
Proof. Suppose that the TTO is using an e¢cient strategy, and whenever there is a positive expected surplus, o¤ering contracts that give zero expected pro…ts to …rms if they participate. Otherwise the TTO o¤ers any contract, and all such contracts give a negative expected payo¤ to the relevant …rm. By de…nition ofn the most e¢cient …rm has a positive expected surplus and under the preceding strategy it clearly participates if the TTO invests in expertise and uses an e¢cient strategy. Therefore the equilibrium set of participating …rms is P 6 = ;: Now suppose towards a contradiction that there are …rms
The expected surplus for k 1 is positive since the expected surplus for k 2 is non-negative under the strategy of TTO. Thus …rm k 1 also …nds it pro…table to participate, contradiction. It is easy to see that the TTO can not bene…t from deviating from the e¢cient strategy once it invests in expertise. This establishes the …rst claim. The second claim follows immediately from the …rst one.
The e¢cient equilibrium, if it exists, weakly Pareto-dominates all other equilibria in the sense that no …rm is worse o¤ and the TTO is strictly better o¤. The e¢cient equilibrium may therefore be regarded as a focal point in the game on which …rms and TTO coordinate. Clearly, if the license revenue obtainable for the TTO is not large enough to recoup the cost of expertise, any equilibrium with technology transfer will fail to exist.
For the e¢cient equilibrium it is now shown that an increase in the number of inventions monotonically increases the number of licenses and hence the license revenue obtainable for the TTO. The reason is that, under the e¢cient selection strategy, the probability that the TTO selects a high-quality invention for any given …rm is monotonically increasing in the size of its invention pool.
Proposition 4 In the e¢cient equilibrium, the number of licensesk is a monotone increasing function in the number of inventions n:
Proof. In an e¢cient equilibrium, we have
which is a monotone increasing function in n: To see this note that
Using this equality we can see that,
The result follows immediately.
The evidence given in Siegel et al. (2000) appears to be consistent with the e¢cient equilibrium. Using a database of 113 U.S. universities, Siegel et al. …nd that the number of disclosed inventions has a positive e¤ect on both the number of licenses as well as the TTO's license revenue.
An attractive feature of the e¢cient equilibrium is that it maximizes not only the licensing revenue for the TTO but also the number of licenses. Note that in the e¢cient equilibrium a …rm participates only when positive surplus is generated from its participation, given that all …rms that are more e¢cient are participating. Therefore there is no other allocation that would achieve a greater number of licenses. In this sense, even when the TTO's main objective is maximizing the number of licenses, it could not do better than what it achieves in the e¢cient equilibrium. Thus committing to maximizing revenues and playing the e¢cient equilibrium achieves multiple objectives for the TTO. 14 Since licensing revenues are maximized, this income may be used for further research, and this is done in a way that the number of licences is maximized.
Competition between intermediaries
In this section we consider a situation with multiple intermediaries. One might expect competition to lead to lower gains from intermediation and hence a lower volume of innovation investments. While a complete analysis of the e¤ects of competition between intermediaries is beyond the scope of the present paper, a simple extension of our university-industry technology transfer framework suggests that this need not be the case. Rather, the innovation investments as envisioned in the e¢cient equilibrium (Proposition 3) is always an equilibrium outcome in the case of multiple intermediaries. However, we will show that competition between intermediaries may also be a source of ine¢cient innovation investments.
Suppose there are two universities, i = 1; 2; each with its own TTO, TTO 1 and TTO 2, respectively. The sequence of decisions is like that of the model in Section 2. At date 0, the TTOs simultaneously decide whether to invest in expertise or not. The investment is observable. If neither of them invests, the game is over and payo¤s to all players are zero. If TTO i invests, it observes the number of high-quality inventions, denoted by m i ; that are available in its invention pool n i , where m i · n i : At date 1, the TTOs and …rms play the following game. The strategy for TTO i is a selection rule, denoted by ¾ i . Each TTO i o¤ers each …rm j 2 K an invention according to its selection rule ¾ i ; and charges a royalty rate ½ i j 2 (0; 1] for the license. Formally, let ¾ i = fs j g j2K be a set of functions, where s j : f1; ::::; n i g ! f0; 1g for each j 2 K: Here s j (m i ) = 1 means that …rm j receives a high-quality invention from TTO i, and s j (m i ) = 0 means that …rm j receives a low-quality invention from TTO i; when there are m i high-quality inventions. We assume that
At date 2, each …rm accepts at most one license o¤er (or rejects both o¤ers). Each …rm has a belief about the TTOs selection rules. We denote the cardinality of each set of participating licensee-…rms P i by #P i : A participating …rm invests A to implement the new technology, and payo¤s are realized.
Let ¼ i j be the probability that …rm j 2 P i will receive a high-quality invention from TTO i, given s j , and let1 i j be …rm j's belief about this probability. The expected payo¤ of a …rm j 2 P i is
LetP i ½ K denote the subset of …rms that TTO i believes would license one of its inventions. The expected payo¤ of TTO i is then
if it invests in expertise.
Just like in the model in Section 2, the game of competing intermediaries has multiple subgame-perfect equilibria due to the large strategy space of the TTOs. In the following we restrict attention to situations in which the TTOs are constrained to employ only certain kinds of selection strategies:
1. E¢cient equilibria, in which the TTOs commit to the e¢cient selection strategy, and …rms' beliefs are compatible with these strategies.
2. Specialization equilibria, in which the TTOs commit to license as many high-quality inventions as possible to …rms of a certain type, and …rms' beliefs are compatible with these strategies.
E¢cient equilibria with multiple intermediaries
Proposition 3 showed that in the case of a monopoly TTO there exists a unique equilibrium where intermediation implements e¢ciency in technology transfer. In this section we demonstrate that the equilibrium identi…ed in Proposition 3 remains an equilibrium when there is competition among TTOs. Competition may however also give rise to another, less e¢cient equilibrium.
Suppose that each TTO, i = 1; 2; commits to the e¢cient strategy ¾ i , and suppose …rms' beliefs are compatible with this selection rule. Let n be the in…mum of the number of inventions available to a TTO such that all …rms are guaranteed to participate in the e¢cient equilibrium of the monopoly game. Such n exists by Proposition 4. We are interested in the e¤ect of competition in situations where n i¸n for at least one TTO. First we consider the case where universities are symmetric with respect to their invention pools, and then proceed to analyze the case of asymmetric invention pools.
Suppose that n 1 = n 2¸n : Thus if both TTOs invest in expertise, …rm j; faced with a contract o¤er from each TTO, expects to get a high-quality invention from each of them with the same probability. Hence, …rm j's best response is to contract with TTO i if
where ½ ¡i j is the royalty rate o¤ered by the other TTO, denoted by TTO ¡i: That is, each …rm prefers a licensing contract with a lower royalty rate to one with a higher royalty rate. 15 Faced with the same expected quality/royalty o¤er, we assume that the …rm contracts with TTO i with probability 1=2 and with TTO ¡i with probability 1=2: The next proposition characterizes the subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome of the overall game when n 1 = n 2¸n :
Proposition 5 Suppose n 1 = n 2¸n . There exists no subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium in which both TTOs engage in technology transfer. There exists a subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium in which only one TTO invests in expertise and all …rms participate if C is not too high.
Proof. Assume, to the contrary, that there exists a subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium in which both TTOs invest in expertise. Consider the associated continuation game, in which each TTO chooses a royalty rate, ½ i j ; for each …rm j 2 K. A necessary condition for the existence of a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in this subgame is ½ 1 j = ½ 2 j = 0 for all j 2 K; for otherwise, one TTO could raise its payo¤ by slightly undercutting the rival's o¤er. That is, the TTOs face Bertrand competition with respect to each single …rm j. Clearly, the licensing revenue obtainable from each …rm j and hence the total revenue for 1 5 This subsection thus considers the extreme case where inventions from di¤erent universities are treated as perfect substitutes. This is of course not always true, but it is likely to be valid whenever there exist alternative techniques for the same purpose, e.g. alternative ways to test a drug, and whenever …rms are not too specialized on certain technology …elds before adoption. We deal with specialization equilibria in the next subsection. each TTO i is zero. Thus, given one TTO invests in expertise in the …rst stage, investment is never pro…table for the other TTO. This contradiction establishes the …rst claim of the proposition. From this, Propositions 3 and the fact that n 1 = n 2¸n , the second claim follows immediately.
The proposition implies that investment by both intermediaries cannot be supported as a subgame-perfect equilibrium despite the initial symmetry of the game. The intuition is the following. In the equilibrium of the technology transfer game that follows the investment by both TTOs, each …rm contracts with the TTO that o¤ers the lowest royalty rate. Hence the TTOs engage in a bidding contest with respect to each single …rm. As a result the …rm obtains the entire surplus. There is hence no way for a TTO to recoup the investment costs. On the other hand, as shown in the previous section, intermediation is clearly attractive for a single TTO as long as the other one remains inactive. The result reveals that a TTO's incentive to invest in expertise depends crucially on the rival TTO's investment choice.
Suppose next that n 2 < n · n 1 . That is, only TTO 1 can ensure participation of all …rms should the rival TTO remain inactive.
Proposition 6 Suppose n 2 < n · n 1 . There exists a unique n 0 with n 0 < n if C is not too high such that:
(i) For n 2 < n 0 · n, there exists a unique subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium. It involves investment in expertise only by TTO 1 and participation by all …rms.
(ii) For n 0 · n 2 < n, there exist two subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibria: one in which only TTO 1 invests and all …rms participate, and another in which only TTO 2 invests and some but not all …rms participate. There exist no other subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibria.
Proof. Suppose that TTO 2 has invested in expertise. Also suppose that n 2 < n: By Proposition 4, the number of participating …rms is a monotone increasing function in n 2 in the e¢cient equilibrium of the technology transfer game. This means that there must be a unique n 2 ; say n 0 ; where n 0 < n; such that the available surplus obtainable for TTO 1 from investing in expertise and competing with TTO 2 in a Bertrand fashion is large enough to recoup TTO 1's cost of expertise whenever n 2 < n 0 . (i) Suppose n 2 < n 0 · n: Since n · n 1 ; there exists a subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium in which only TTO 1 invests in expertise and all …rms participate. This follows from arguments similar to the ones made in the proof of the previous proposition. Suppose now that both TTOs invest in expertise. Since each TTO i employs the e¢cient strategy ¾ i , and since n 2 < n · n 1 by hypothesis, it follows that for all …rms the probability of getting a high quality invention from TTO 1 is higher than from TTO 2: This means that these …rms will contract with TTO 2 only if it o¤ers a royalty rate that is low enough. Since n 2 < n 0 there is a cuto¤ level of e¢ciency such that, for the …rms less e¢cient than that cuto¤ TTO 2 can not o¤er a low enough royalty rate to induce their participation. For …rms that are more e¢cient than the cuto¤ …rm such a royalty rate is strictly positive. Thus, TTO 1 has incentive to slightly undercut TTO 2; and they will engage in Bertrand type competition. In either case, TTO 2's payo¤ is zero. Consequently, TTO 2 has no incentive to invest in expertise in the …rst place, thus contradicting the hypothesis that there is a subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium in which both TTOs invest in expertise. Now, assume that there exists a subgame-perfect e¢cient equilibrium in which only TTO 2 invests in expertise. Since TTO 2 employs the e¢cient strategy ¾ 2 , and since n 2 < n, the candidate equilibrium involves non-participation by some …rms. Since n 2 < n 0 ; by de…nition of n 0 , TTO 1 has an incentive to deviate by investing in expertise. This, however, contradicts the hypothesis that there is another e¢cient equilibrium in which only TTO 2 invests in expertise. The proof of statement 1 is hence complete.
(ii) The statement for the case of n 0 · n 2 < n follows straightforwardly from similar arguments.
The analysis reveals that the market for university inventions tends to favor concentrated intermediation. Proposition 6 suggests that the identity of the active TTO is uniquely determined when the di¤erences between the universities in terms of their invention output is su¢ciently large. In this case the larger university will provide the intermediation service for the economy. This may explain why some universities form regional networks and share a common TTO, such as for example Access Technology Across Indiana (ATAIN), a statewide alliance by universities in Indiana, including Indiana State University, Indiana University, and Purdue University.
On the other hand, the proposition also shows that intermediation by the TTO with the smaller invention pool and non-participation by some …rms may be a possible equilibrium outcome whenever the di¤erence in invention pools is not large enough. There is hence the possibility of a welfare loss.
Specialization equilibria
Specialization is often observed in markets with intermediaries. Sometimes specialization involves the investment in di¤erent kinds of expertise. For example, one TTO may special-ize in biotechnology, whereas another one may specialize in communication technology. On the other hand, we show here that this is not necessarily the case, and specialization may be just an equilibrium phenomenon where each TTO commits to license to an arbitrary but di¤erent group of …rms. That is, specialization may arise even if "true" specialization in terms of acquiring an expertise for certain …elds of technology is not possible.
Consider a partition of …rms into two sets, G 1 and G 2 with G 1 \G 2 = ;; and G 1 [G 2 = K: That is, the groups of …rms are disjoint sets and each …rm is a member of one or the other group, e.g., G 1 includes all odd-numbered …rms and G 2 all even-numbered …rms. We denote the cardinality of G 1 and G 2 by #G 1 and #G 2 ; respectively. Let G 1 be TTO 1's priority group, and G 2 that of the other TTO. We make use of the following de…nition. 
Note that in the specialization equilibrium each TTO assigns as many high-quality inventions as possible to the most e¢cient …rms in its own priority group, and if there are more high-quality inventions than …rms in that group, it assigns each remaining highquality invention to the most e¢cient …rms in the other TTO's priority group.
We now show that the model admits a subgame-perfect specialization equilibrium. This equilibrium is supported by compatible …rm beliefs. That is, each …rm believes that allocating the available high-quality inventions to …rms j 2 G i ; G i ½ K; is a priority for TTO i. To ensure the existence of the equilibrium, we make the following restrictions on the size of each TTO's invention pool. First, assume that n i¸nG i ; wheren G i is the size of the invention pool that is necessary to make participation pro…table for the most e¢cient …rm j 2 G i in the e¢cient equilibrium of the monopoly game when this …rm for sure gets the good invention from TTO i if there is one, i = 1; 2: 16 Second, let n G i be the in…mum of n i such that the most e¢cient …rm in KnG i is left with non-negative surplus in the specialization equilibrium. Assume that n i < n G i ; i = 1; 2. 17 Proposition 7 Supposen G i · n i < n G i ; i = 1; 2: There exists a subgame-perfect specialization equilibrium with a uniquek i · #G i such that each …rm j 2 Gk i i licenses from TTO i if C is not too high.
Proof. Consider the continuation game where both TTOs have invested in expertise. If …rms' beliefs are compatible, it is easy to check that the described equilibrium involves a set of licensing contracts that satisfy
for any …rm j 2 Gk i i ; i = 1; 2: To see this, note that since n i < n G i ; i = 1; 2; each …rm j 2 G i believes that the probability that it obtains a high-quality invention from TTO ¡i is too low to make licensing from ¡i pro…table for any ½ ¡i j . That is, faced with a contract o¤er from each TTO, a …rm j 2 G i always prefers a license from i over a license from ¡i. There is hence no pro…table deviation for any TTO by choosing a di¤erent royalty rate, given the other TTO's selection strategy and compatible …rm beliefs.
We will now check whether any TTO can gain by deviating from both, its selection strategy and royalty choice. Let j 0 be the least e¢cient …rm j 2 G i that obtains a highquality invention from TTO i in the candidate equilibrium. Clearly, the best possible deviation consists of a reallocation of a high-quality invention from j 0 to a …rm j 00 2 G 3¡i with j 00 < j 0 ; i.e. a …rm of the rival TTO's priority group that is more e¢cient that j 0 . Since n i < n G i , however, there exists no contract ½ i j 00 that would induce …rm j 00 to license from TTO i given sceptical belief against i: To see this, note that the described deviation does not change the …rm's belief and therefore its participation decision as …rms are unable to observe the TTO's selection strategy. That is, …rm j 00 expects to obtain a low-quality invention from TTO i with such a high probability that licensing from i is not pro…table for that …rm. Clearly, the same argument holds for any …rm j 2 G 3¡i . Hence the TTO cannot gain by deviating from the specialization strategy.
We have thus shown that the specialization strategies are best responses to each other and constitute an equilibrium in the innovation game that follows each TTO's investment in expertise. Clearly, it is required that C must not be too large for the expertise investment to be pro…table for each TTO. The proof is complete.
The result demonstrates that specialization to certain target groups can emerge in a competitive market for university inventions. The basic features which lead to specialization are the possibility to partition the set of …rms in di¤erent subsets, an intermediatesized invention pool of each university, and su¢ciently low costs of expertise. Under these circumstances the TTOs can avoid Bertrand competition in the contract stage. This allows them to recoup the cost of expertise up to a certain level, despite the presence of an active rival.
What are the welfare consequences of specialization? Our analysis has revealed that specialization may cause a waste of high-quality inventions ex post if m i > #G i and m 3¡i < #G 3¡i , i.e. if for one TTO the number of high-quality inventions exceeds the number of …rms in its priority group, and vice versa for the other TTO. Given pessimistic beliefs of …rms in the rival TTO's priority group, a TTO will not be able to match them with its remaining (m i ¡ #G i ) high-quality inventions. That is, the social gains from innovation may not be maximized ex post in the specialization equilibrium. Moreover, it is worth noting that specialization involves investments by two TTOs where one investment would have been su¢cient to solve the problem of uncertainty for the economy if the investor had access to both invention pools. Combining TTO services may therefore be a way to improve social welfare.
Intermediation with inventor involvement
The above analysis abstracts from the inventors' role in the innovation process by treating the probability that an invention is of high quality as exogenous. In this section we endogenize this probability by assuming that it depends on the inventor's development e¤ort and giving each inventor the choice of whether to expend such e¤ort or not. We thus essentially combine our model of Section 2 with that of .
We rede…ne the probability that an invention is of high quality as p i for invention i. Following Jensen and Thursby, we assume that the probability of success depends on the inventor's development e¤ort, which is not contractible. We make the simplifying assumption that p i = p if inventor i invests E > 0; and p i = 0 otherwise, where p 2 (0; 1] : Furthermore, we replace the assumption on the cost of expertise accordingly by assuming that
The sequence of decisions in the extended framework is as follows. The investment decision by the TTO at date 0 remains as before. At date 1, the TTO o¤ers each …rm j a licensing contract for an invention i. The contract now speci…es the royalties for the TTO and inventor i, denoted by ½ T ij 2 (0; 1] and ½ i ij 2 (0; 1] ; respectively, with ½ T ij + ½ i ij · 1: At date 2, …rm j accepts or rejects the contract. If it accepts, a development stage follows at date 3 in which the inventor i can choose to increase the probability of success by expending e¤orts in the development of his invention. Since e¤orts are non-contractible, there is a moral hazard problem with respect to the inventor's e¤ort, exactly as in the model of Jensen and Thursby. Finally, the outcome of the inventor's development e¤ort is observed and the licensee-…rm decides whether to invest A for the implementation of the new technology.
Denote the set of participating inventors by Q µ f1; :::; kg : The expected payo¤ of a …rm j 2 P is
and the expected payo¤ of the TTO is 18
Inventors and …rms will participate whenever they obtain a non-negative payo¤. It is not di¢cult to check that in equilibrium the TTO sets the royalty rates ½ i ij and ½ T ij such that inventors and …rms choose to participate and are left with zero surplus. Hence, as in , an inventor will be motivated to engage in the development of the new technology by tying his payo¤ to that of the licensee-…rm. Apart from this, the analysis of the extended game is qualitatively the same as that in Section 3. Moreover, note that an incentive contract could in principle be directly signed between the inventor and the licensee-…rm, once a match is made. This suggest that, despite the moral hazard problem with inventor e¤ort, the intermediary's e¤orts in locating pro…table inventions and matching them with potential licensees may be a crucial element of e¤ective technology transfer.
Concluding remarks
Summary The paper o¤ers a new theoretical framework to investigate the organization of innovation investments. Our main …nding is that intermediaries can play a crucial role in forming the market for inventions by providing an opportunity to economize on a critical component of innovation decisions under uncertainty: the expertise to locate new inventions and evaluate their commercial value. Using a model of university-industry technology transfer, we have identi…ed conditions under which in equilibrium intermediation in innovation becomes viable: …rst, success-based compensation schemes must be feasible, and second, the size of the invention pool must be su¢ciently large, suggesting the presence of economies of scale.
While we have demonstrated that intermediation can reduce and eliminate the uncertainty problems in the relation between creators and users of new inventions, the study also identi…es limitations to the potential e¢ciency of intermediation activity. First, the intermediary's selection incentives in the market for inventions need not be fully aligned with society's interest. Second, the intermediaries incentive to invest in expertise strongly depends upon the investors' beliefs about the intermediaries selection strategy, introducing a high potential of coordination failure. Indeed, no investment in expertise and no innovation is always an equilibrium of our model. Third, competition between intermediaries may be an additional source of ine¢ciency. In particular, the identity of the active intermediary may not be optimal from a welfare point of view as well as the market division in the case of specialized intermediaries.
Empirical evidence The …ndings are supported by empirical evidence. In the context of university-industry technology transfer, Hsu and Bernstein's (1997) case studies suggest that a critical mass of university research activity is often required before a university technology transfer o¢ce (TTO) can become active. Using an econometric model, Siegel et al. (2000) estimate the impact of the number of disclosed inventions on the license revenue of TTOs and …nd strong evidence of increasing returns to scale, which is consistent with our model. In their extensive …eld research on organizational practices of university TTOs, Siegel et al. …nd that …rms often view the skills and expertise of TTO sta¤ as critical to the e¤ectiveness of university-industry technology transfer. Nevertheless, they also …nd that some TTOs appear to have little incentives to invest in expertise. Our results may provide a possible explanation for this observation: universities may not have a pool of commercializable technologies large enough to make such an investment attractive.
Of course, there are also cases where …rms receive information about the existence and value of university inventions from other sources, making intermediation activity less relevant. Audretsch and Stephan (1996) and Zucker et al. (1998) , for example, …nd evidence that the personal characteristics of the inventors, such as the status of being a "star" scientists as measured in terms of research productivity or the receipt of a Nobel prize, can play an important role in attracting …rms of the biotechnology industry. On the other hand, such cases appear to be a "right-tail of the distribution" phenomenon, which primarily happens at the very best universities with top scientists in each …eld. The model developed in this paper thus seems best applicable to "representative" universities and scientists.
Policy relevance The approach developed in this paper may help to understand the effects of a recent regulatory change related to government-sponsored research in the United States, the Bayh-Dole Patent and Trademark Amendments Act of 1980, 19 and frame current government initiatives aimed at copying the Bayh-Dole Act in Germany and Japan. 20 The Act gave universities the right to retain title to and license inventions resulting from federally funded research and permitted exclusive licensing between universities and industrial …rms for these inventions. Since the passage of the Act, an increasing number of U.S. universities began to establish TTOs, and the number of academic licenses increased signi…cantly. 21 As the analysis in this paper suggests, TTOs can play a crucial role in forming a market for university inventions, provided they obtain su¢cient royalty revenue to recoup the investment in expertise. Clearly, the feasibility of running royalties depends on whether universities hold the property rights and are able to license faculty inventions on an exclusive basis. 22 Thus, e¤ective TTO intermediation appears to became a viable option for universities only after the regulatory changes.
Future research The analysis and results of the paper seem to carry over to the context of underwriters and technology-based business incubators who intermediate between 1 9 For a discussion of the policy debates on the Bayh-Dole Act and a survey over the related empirical and theoretical literature, see Ja¤e (2000). new start-up …rms and potential investors, trying to convince a particular investor that a particular start-up …rm is pro…table. Venture capitalists di¤er crucially from TTOs, underwriters, and incubators in that they raise money in advance, promising potential investors to reinvest the money in pro…table projects on their behalf. Thus, addressing this form of intermediation would require a modi…cation of our model by considering selection rules that do not depend on the identity of a particular investor and particular invention or project. Nonetheless, we expect the main conclusions of the paper to hold in such a context. The model could be usefully extended to analyze the e¤ects of intermediation on the interplay between the investor's incentives to commercialize inventions and the inventor's incentives to generate new inventions. It seems also worth exploring specialization incentives of competing intermediaries in a model where inventions di¤er with respect to their commercial value. For example, the average invention from the medical school may have a larger commercial value than the average invention from, say, the physics department. In the context of university-industry technology transfer, a related potential extension of the model would include competition between universities for talented faculty.
Finally, we would like to emphasize that the timing and nature of innovation are fundamental issues in the understanding of economic growth. Hence, results which draw on a careful analysis of intermediation in innovation may provide signi…cant implications for policies on economic growth.
